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Abstract
This paper conducts a quantitative study of the optimal exchange-rate policy in
a small open economy that faces the “credit access–unemployment” trade-off: In the
presence of nominal wage rigidity, exchange-rate depreciation reduces unemployment;
in the presence of collateral constraints linking external debt to the value of income,
exchange-rate depreciation tightens the collateral constraint and leads to higher con-
sumption adjustments. It is shown that the optimal policy during financial crises
generally features large currency depreciation, since welfare costs related to higher
unemployment and lower consumption typically outweigh welfare costs associated
with intertemporal misallocation of consumption. The optimal policy also implies a
lower currency depreciation than that necessary to achieve full employment, which is
consistent with a managed-floating exchange-rate policy, frequently observed during
financial crises in emerging market economies. Sudden stops (or large current-account
adjustments) are part of the endogenous response to large negative shocks under the
optimal exchange-rate policy.
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1 Introduction
During an external crises, exchange-rate policy in emerging market economies (EMs) seem
to leave policymakers between a rock and a hard place: Preventing currency depreciation
could bring more unemployment, but if liabilities are denominated in foreign currency,
currency depreciation could increase debt in terms of domestic income, leading to financial
destabilization, and compromising credit access. The potential conflict for exchange-rate
policy between these two welfare concerns, credit access and unemployment, is often a
central element of the policy debate, as was observed during the East Asian and Latin
American crises in the late 1990s (Fischer, 1998; Calvo, 2001; Stiglitz, 2002) and during
the peripheral European crises that started in 2008 (see, for example, Krugman, 2010;
Feldstein, 2011).
This paper conducts a quantitative analysis of the optimal exchange-rate policy when
facing this “credit access–unemployment” trade-off. It constructs an environment that
provides a theoretical justification for this trade-off, combining two frictions that have
been largely studied in the literature: a downward nominal wage rigidity (as in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe, 2011), and a financial friction by which external borrowing is denomi-
nated in the international unit of account and limited by the value of collateral in the form
of tradable and nontradable income (as in Mendoza, 2002). In this framework, credit-
access and unemployment are two conflicting factors affecting welfare: Devaluations are
associated with a welfare gain – by decreasing the real value of wages they reduce invol-
untary unemployment – but are also associated with a welfare cost – by increasing the
value of external debt in terms of domestic income, they tighten the collateral constraint
and can trigger an endogenous “sudden stop.”1
The main finding, in calibrated versions of the model, is that two features characterize
the optimal exchange-rate policy during financial crises (defined as episodes of binding
credit constraints). First, the optimal allocation generally implies a large real exchange
rate depreciation (between a 17 and 40 percent fall on average in the relative price of non-
tradables), which is achieved by allowing for nominal currency depreciation. The reason
is that, the welfare costs related to higher unemployment and lower consumption are typi-
cally higher than the welfare costs related to intertemporal misallocation of consumption.
Second, optimal currency depreciation is generally lower than that associated with full
employment. Thus, the optimal policy is consistent with a managed-floating exchange-
rate policy, frequently observed in EMs during financial crises (see, for example, Calvo
and Reinhart, 2002). Moreover, the real exchange-rate depreciation and current account
adjustment under the optimal exchange rate policy during episodes of binding collateral
constraints is in line with the dynamics observed in the data during sudden stops. The
1Calvo (1998) labeled sudden stops episodes of large and abrupt reversals in external credit flows that
characterize EMs. For a review of the Fisherian debt-deflation approach to sudden stops, including the
form of collateral constraint used in this paper, see Korinek and Mendoza (2013).
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paper shows that the nature of the shocks and the structural characteristics of the econ-
omy are key determinants for the optimal degree of “fear of floating” during financial
crises: Higher external interest rates, a larger intertemporal or intratemporal elasticity of
substitution, or a large mobility of labor across sectors, call for a smaller unemployment;
a more elastic labor supply, or a higher share of income that can be used as collateral,
call for more contained currency depreciation.
Welfare under the optimal exchange-rate policy is compared to that under a full-
employment and a fixed exchange-rate regimes. The full-employment exchange-rate
regime is costly in terms of welfare for making consumption adjust more than what is
optimal during periods of binding collateral constraints. The fixed exchange-rate regime
is costly for inducing an inefficient adjustment to negative shocks with involuntary unem-
ployment, in periods of both nonbinding and binding collateral constraints. This different
nature of welfare costs generally makes the fixed exchange-rate regime more costly, in
terms of welfare, than the full-employment exchange-rate regime. The welfare cost of the
full-employment and fixed exchange-rate regimes, with respect to the optimal exchange-
rate policy, are larger in regions of the state-space where the collateral constraint binds,
with an average welfare cost during periods of binding collateral constraints of 0.06 percent
and 1.8 percent of consumption per period, respectively.
This is the first paper that conducts a quantitative study of nominal exchange-rate
policy under a collateral constraint by which debt is limited by the value of collateral in
the form of tradable and nontradable income. Introduced in Mendoza (2002), this form
of financial friction has been widely used to capture the main stylized facts about sudden
stops in EMs.2 This form of collateral constraint causes endogenous sudden stops through
Fisher’s (1933) debt-deflation mechanism: Binding constraints lead to deleveraging, which
leads to a fall in the price of nontradables, which further tightens the collateral constraint.
Previous studies using this form of financial friction have considered real models, in which
the policy instrument during periods of binding collateral constraints is a tax (subsidy)
on nontradable or tradable goods (see, for example, Benigno et al., 2012a). The present
paper expands this literature by considering a nominal model and a monetary instrument,
which present the policymaker a different trade-off: While subsidizing nontradable goods
leads simultaneously to increased employment and higher prices of nontradable goods
(relaxing the credit constraint), currency depreciation leads to an increase in employment
and a decrease in the price of nontradable goods (tightening the credit constraint).3
2See, for example, Mendoza (2005), Durdu, Mendoza, and Terrones (2009), Korinek (2011), Bianchi
(2011), Benigno et al. (2011,2012a,b,c).
3In particular, it can be shown that in the model economy presented in Section 2, using taxes on
nontradable or tradable consumption together with the capital-control tax, a Ramsey planner can achieve
an allocation characterized by full employment and nonbinding collateral constraint in all states. See
Benigno et al. (2012b) for a similar result in an economy without wage rigidity.
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The paper is related to the large body of literature that studies nominal exchange-rate
policy in small open economies during financial crises. A key difference with respect to this
literature is the form of financial friction studied in the present paper, which in turn leads
to different policy implications. For instance, in a large subset of this literature, borrowing
access is linked to asset prices: Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004), Devereux, Lane, and
Xu (2006), Curdia (2007), and Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007) study economies
featuring the financial accelerator mechanism (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999). In
a recent related paper, Fornaro (2013) study an economy with a collateral constraint that
limits external debt to a fraction of the market value of asset holdings (as in Bianchi and
Mendoza, 2011). In these frameworks, currency depreciations have a positive effect on
output, that leads to higher asset prices and improved credit access. As a consequence,
contrary to the present paper’s result, in these papers flexible exchange rates lead to
more financial stability during crises than fixed exchange rates. In the present setup,
borrowing access is linked to goods prices: Debt denominated in a foreign currency is
limited by the market value of tradable and nontradable income. The combination of
a nontradable sector and liability dollarization creates a currency mismatch that makes
currency depreciation financially destabilizing (in line with the traditional “original sin”
argument; see Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza, 2005; Calvo, 1999).
The hypothesis of currency depreciations being financially destabilizing has been pre-
viously formalized, for instance, in Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001), and in Brag-
gion, Christiano, and Roldos (2009) using credit constraints on firms. In these papers,
however, currency depreciations are financially destabilizing because they cause output
contraction. In the present paper, currency depreciations are not contractionary (they
reduce unemployment), but the associated currency mismatch reduces the value of in-
come, leading to a large consumption adjustment under binding credit constraints and
entailing a welfare cost. For these reasons, the form of financial friction considered in this
paper gives rise to a trade-off between credit access and unemployment that has not been
formally studied in the literature of exchange-rate policy in small open economies during
financial crises.
The policy choice under the trade-off studied in this paper has engendered a long-
standing and still lively policy debate. Keynes, for instance, was first actively opposed to
the return of Britain to the gold standard after World War I, arguing that it would be
associated with high unemployment (Keynes, 1925). However, when the Great Depression
started, Keynes recommended against devaluation, claiming that now the costs in terms of
debt revaluation and financial destabilization would outweigh the benefits (Irwin, 2011).
In the same line, Diaz-Alejandro (1965), analyzing Argentina’s exchange-rate policy in
the 1950s, highlighted the possibility that devaluations would lead to negative wealth
effects and adjustment in consumption from income distribution and balance-sheet effects.
This policy debate was triggered again by the crisis in peripheral Europe that started
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in 2008, in which there are, simultaneously, high unemployment and high debt levels
denominated in euros. Moreover, the empirical literature suggests that both sides of the
debate are supported by evidence. Cross-country regressions for EMs tend to show both
that fixing the exchange rate during financial crisis episodes is associated with larger
output contractions (see, for example, Ortiz et al., 2009), and that currency mismatch
plays a key role in determining the access to international credit markets (see, for example,
Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia, 2008).
Finally, it is worth noting that while most of the above-mentioned literature on nomi-
nal exchange rate policy in small open economies during financial crises compare different
(possibly nonoptimal) exchange-rate regimes, the present paper derives the fully optimal
exchange-rate policy.4 The paper shows that the optimal allocation is a nonmonotonic
function of the states; therefore, considering the optimal policy, instead of comparing
exchange-rate regimes, is relevant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model econ-
omy. Section 3 defines three possible exchange-rate regimes in this setup (optimal, full-
employment, and fixed exchange-rate policies) and provides analytical results describ-
ing the exchange-rate policy trade-off that emerges in this economy. Section 4 presents
the quantitative analysis comparing the aggregate dynamics and welfare under the three
exchange-rate regimes. Section 5 examines the sensitivity of results to different calibra-
tions and changes in the baseline model’s assumptions. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model Economy
This section describes the model economy used to conduct exchange-rate policy analysis.
It extends the two-sector (tradable and nontradable), dynamic, stochastic, small open
economy model with a downward nominal wage rigidity from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2011), to include a collateral constraint in the form of tradable and nontradable income.
The economy only has access to a one-period, non-state-contingent debt instrument, de-
nominated in units of tradable goods, capturing liability dollarization. The model then
features a nominal rigidity and two financial frictions that will interact to determine the
exchange-rate policy trade-off.
Tradables are endowed to the economy, and their price is determined by the law of
one price. Nontradables are produced by the economy, and their price is determined by
domestic demand and supply. Fluctuations in the small open economy are driven by
4Optimal monetary policy has been largely studied in open economies with complete asset markets,
and in open economies in which the financial friction is that financial markets are incomplete; see, for
example, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001), Devereux and Engel (2003),
Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Gali and Monacelli (2005), De Paoli (2009), Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc
(2010), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011). The present paper constitutes a contribution in this direction
for a small open economy in which financial frictions include an imperfect access to credit markets, with
the presence of occasionally binding collateral constraints.
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exogenous shocks to the value of the tradable endowment (which can be interpreted as
shocks to terms of trade or to productivity in the tradable sector) and to the interest rate
on external debt, two sources of business-cycle fluctuations that have been widely studied
in EMs (Mendoza, 1995; Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Uribe and Yue, 2006).
2.1 Households




βtU (ct) , (1)
where ct denotes consumption in period t; the function U (·) is assumed to be continuous,
twice differentiable, strictly increasing, and concave; the subjective discount factor β ∈
(0, 1), and Et denotes expectation conditional on the information set available at time t.
The consumption good is assumed to be a composite of tradable and nontradable













ξ + (1− a) (cNt )1− 1ξ ] ξξ−1 , (2)
where cTt denotes tradable consumption and c
N
t denotes nontradable consumption.
Each period, households receive a stochastic endowment (yTt ) and profits from the
ownership of firms producing nontradable goods (Πt). They inelastically supply h hours
of work to the labor market. (Section 5.3 relaxes these assumptions studying production
in the tradable sector and an elastic labor supply.) Due to the presence of the wage
rigidity (discussed in detail in the next sections), households will only be able to sell
ht ≤ h hours in the labor market. The level of actual hours worked (ht) is determined by
firms and is taken as given by the households.
Households have access to a one-period, non-state-contingent bond denominated in
units of tradable goods that can be traded internationally paying an exogenous and
stochastic gross interest rate Rt. The model therefore assumes full liability dollarization.




, follows a first-order
Markov process. Debt acquired in period t is taxed at rate τdt . Households’ sequential
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)− Tt, (3)




denotes the relative price of nontradables in terms of tradables, wt denotes the wage rate
in terms of tradable goods, and Tt denotes a lump sum transfer in period t.
It is assumed that households face a collateral constraint by which external debt
cannot exceed a fraction κ of income:
dt+1 ≤ κ
(




where κ > 0. This form of collateral constraint, introduced in Mendoza (2002), has been
used extensively in the literature on small open economies to capture the effect of cur-
rency mismatch on external credit-market access: While collateral includes income from
both tradable and nontradable sectors, external debt is fully denominated in units of
tradables. The credit-market frictions from which this constraint arises are not modeled
here explicitly, but this form of collateral constraint can be seen as describing an environ-
ment in which lenders manage default risk by imposing a debt limit linked to households’
current income, as is typically the case of lending criteria in mortgage or consumer credit
markets.5 Empirical evidence suggests that current income is a significant determinant
of credit market access (Jappelli, 1990).
In addition, households are assumed to face a no-Ponzi game constraint of the form
dt+1 ≤ dN , (5)
where dN denotes the natural debt limit. As in Aiyagari (1994), this is defined as the
maximum value of external debt that the household can repay almost surely starting from
that period, assuming that its tradable consumption is zero forever. Formally, denoting
yT as the minimum possible level of tradable endowment and R as the maximum possible
level of external interest rate, the natural debt limit is defined as dN ≡ R
R−1y
T . Since the
collateral value in the credit limit (4) depends on relative prices which can be affected by
policy variables, constraint (5) is imposed in addition to (4) is in order to prevent Ponzi
schemes induced by the policymaker (Mendoza, 2005; Benigno et al., 2012b).




t , and dt+1 that
maximize the expected utility (1) subject to the consumption aggregation technology (2),
the sequential budget constraint (3), the collateral constraint (4), and the no-Ponzi game
constraint (5), for a given initial debt level, d0; for the given sequence of prices, wt and pt;
for the given sequence of hours worked, ht, profits, Πt, stochastic tradable endowment,
yTt , and interest rate, Rt; and for the given sequence of policies, τ
d
t and Tt.
Denoting by λt the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (3) and
by µt the Lagrange multiplier associated with the collateral constraint (4), the optimality
conditions (provided dt+1 < d






















≡ P (cTt , cNt ) = pt, (8)
and the complementary slackness conditions




yTt + wtht + Πt
)− dt+1) = 0. (9)
5Korinek (2011) shows that this form of the collateral constraint can be rationalized as a renegotiation-
proof form of debt contract in an imperfect credit market in which households can renegotiate external
debt and lenders can extract at most a fraction of borrowers’ current income if debt is renegotiated.
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2.2 Firms
Each period, operating in competitive labor and product markets, firms hire labor to
produce the nontradable good, yNt . Profits each period are given by
Πt = ptF (ht)− wtht,
where the production function, F (·), is assumed to be increasing and concave.
The firms’ problem is to choose ht to maximize profits given prices pt and wt. The
first-order condition of this problem is
ptF
′ (ht) = wt. (10)
This condition implicitly defines the firms’ demand for labor.
2.3 The Labor Market
Nominal wages (Wt) are assumed to be downwardly rigid as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2011):6
Wt ≥ γWt−1,
for γ > 0.
It is assumed that the law of one price holds for tradable goods, implying that P Tt =
EtP
T∗
t , where Et is the nominal exchange rate and P
T∗
t is the foreign currency price of
tradable goods. Assuming that P T∗t is constant and normalized to one, wages in terms of









where t is the gross depreciation rate of the nominal exchange rate: t ≡ EtEt−1 . However,
actual hours worked cannot exceed the inelastically supplied level of hours:
ht ≤ h. (12)
When the nominal wage rigidity binds, the labor market can exhibit involuntary un-








6The assumption of an asymmetric nominal wage rigidity is consistent with empirical evidence using
microeconomic data (e.g., Gottschalk, 2005; Barattieri, Basu and Gottschalk, 2010; Daly, Hobijn, and
Lucking, 2012).
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This condition means that when the nominal wage rigidity is not binding, the labor market
must exhibit full employment, and if it exhibits unemployment, it must be the case that
the nominal wage rigidity is binding.
2.4 The Government
The government determines the exchange-rate depreciation, t, and imposes a propor-
tional tax (subsidy) on debt τdt , which is rebated lump sum to households (Tt), to balance
its budget each period:
dt+1
Rt
τdt = Tt. (14)
Section 3 defines different exchange-rate regimes and how the capital-control tax is deter-
mined.
2.5 General Equilibrium Dynamics
The market for nontradable goods clears at all times:
cNt = F (ht). (15)
Combining the equilibrium price equation, (8), with condition (15), the firms’ opti-










ξ F ′ (ht) . (16)
Combining condition (15) with households’ budget constraint, (3), the definition of




= dt + c
T
t − yTt . (17)
Using the definition of firms’ profits, the equilibrium price equation, (8), and the















≡ d (ht, cTt , yTt ) . (18)
The general equilibrium dynamics are then given by stochastic processes
{cNt , cTt , ht, pt, wt, dt+1, λt, µt, Tt}∞t=0 satisfying the set of equations (GE):
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)− dt+1) = 0,
(11): wt ≥ γwt−1t ,























ξ F ′ (ht) ,
(17): dt+1R
−1
t = dt + c
T
t − yTt ,














given an exchange-rate policy {t}∞t=0, a capital-control tax policy {τdt }∞t=0, initial condi-
tions w−1 and d0, and exogenous stochastic processes {yTt , Rt}∞t=0.
3 Exchange-Rate Regimes: Definitions and
Analytical Results
This section formally defines the optimal exchange-rate policy, and discusses the trade-off
between credit access and unemployment that exchange-rate policy can face in the model
economy presented in the previous section. Analytical results relating credit access and
unemployment are established, providing a framework for understanding the quantitative
characterization of the optimal exchange-rate policy to be presented in the next section.
Two additional exchange-rate regimes are also defined in this section – full-employment
and fixed exchange-rate policy – to provide standard benchmarks for the study of the
optimal exchange-rate policy.
3.1 Definition of Exchange-Rate Regimes
This section defines three possible exchange-rate regimes: optimal, full-employment, and
fixed exchange-rate policy. Exchange-rate regimes are defined conditional on an optimal
capital-control tax policy (τdt ). The reason for using this capital-control tax is twofold.
First, previous literature has shown that both the credit constraint and the downward
wage rigidity considered in this paper embody a pecuniary externality that may induce
inefficient external borrowing (Bianchi, 2011; Beningo et al., 2012a; and Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe, 2013).7 The optimal capital-control tax policy eliminates any borrowing inef-
7Inefficient borrowing arises when the social costs of borrowing differ from the private costs of borrow-
ing. Bianchi (2011) shows that in an endowment economy, the collateral constraint in the form of tradable
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ficiency, and allows for a comparison across exchange-rate regimes isolating the effect of
exchange-rate policy from this distortion.
Second, without the optimal capital-control tax, the set of restrictions for the opti-
mal policy includes a forward-looking constraint (namely, the household’s intertemporal
borrowing decision (6)). As shown in Kydland and Prescott (1977), Bellman’s (1957)
principle of optimality fails in this context, and standard dynamic programming tech-
niques cannot be applied. Using an optimal capital-control tax technically simplifies the
problem, allowing for the use of standard dynamic programming techniques. Nevertheless,
Section 5.4 studies the sensitivity of the optimal exchange-rate policy to the assumption
of optimal capital-control taxes by restricting the Ramsey planner’s set of available in-
struments to the nominal exchange rate. In this context, time-invariant optimal policies
under commitment are obtained using the recursive saddle-point method developed in
Marcet and Marimon (2011).
3.1.1 Optimal Exchange-Rate Policy







that maximize households’ expected lifetime utility (1) subject
to the set of equations describing the general equilibrium dynamics (GE).
To characterize the allocation under the optimal exchange-rate policy with optimal
capital-control taxes, I set up the Ramsey problem dropping constraints (6)–(9), (11),






that satisfy (5), (12), (17),







, subject to (5), (12), (17), and (18). The dynamics under the optimal






































d′ ≤ dN ,
h ≤ h,
and nontradable income induces overborrowing, in the sense that the social costs of borrowing exceed the
private costs of borrowing; in this setup, the constrained social planner borrows less than the competitive
equilibrium. Beningo et al. (2011, 2012a) define overborrowing (underborrowing) as a situation in which
a constrained social planner would take on less (more) debt than decentralized agents; in this sense, the
authors find that whether an economy with this form of collateral constraint features overborrowing or
underborrowing depends on the structure of the economy (e.g., endowment or production), and on the
calibration. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2013) show that the downward wage rigidity, combined with a
fixed exchange-rate policy, induces overborrowing.
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where time subscripts for variables dated in period t have been dropped, and a prime is




denotes the value function for
households under optimal exchange-rate and capital-control tax policies. This formulation
will be used in the quantitative analysis.
3.1.2 Full-Employment Exchange-Rate Policy
For this regime, consider an exchange-rate policy aimed at maintaining full employment
at all states and dates: Under the full-employment policy,
ht = h, ∀t. (20)
Definition 2 The full-employment exchange-rate policy with optimal capital-control taxes






that maximize households’ expected lifetime utility (1) sub-
ject to the set of equations describing the general equilibrium dynamics (GE), and the
full-employment constraint (20).
To characterize the optimal allocation under the full-employment policy, I follow the
same strategy as for the optimal exchange-rate policy and drop constraints (6)–(9) and






that satisfy (5), (17), (18), and (20),
also satisfy (GE) and (20). Therefore, the dynamics under the full-employment exchange-














































denotes the value function for households under the full-employment
exchange-rate policy with optimal capital-control taxes.
3.1.3 Fixed Exchange-Rate Policy
Finally, consider a policy aimed at keeping the exchange rate fixed at all states and dates:
Under the fixed exchange-rate policy or currency peg,
t = 1, ∀t. (22)







that maximize households’ expected lifetime utility (1) subject to
the set of equations describing the general equilibrium dynamics (GE), and currency peg
constraint (22).
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To characterize the allocation under the currency peg with optimal capital-control
taxes, I follow a similar strategy to that of the optimal exchange-rate policy and drop




t , ht, wt, t
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that
satisfy (5), (11)–(13), (16)–(18), and (22), also satisfy (GE) and (22). Thus, the dynamics





















































ξ F ′ (h) ,
where V PEG
(
sX , d, w−1
)
denotes the value function for households under the currency
peg and optimal capital-control taxes and the subscript −1 is used to indicate variables
dated in period t− 1.
3.2 Optimal Exchange-Rate Policy, Unemployment and Credit Limit:
Analytical Results
This section studies the relationship between unemployment and the credit limit under the
optimal exchange-rate policy. Although, given the complexity of the model, a numerical
solution is required for a full characterization, some analytical results can be obtained
to show the trade-off involved in exchange-rate policy. These results will be relevant
to understanding the next section’s numerical solution for the dynamics of the economy
under the optimal exchange-rate policy. Proposition 1 characterizes the allocation under
the optimal exchange-rate policy defined in the previous section.
Proposition 1. Under the optimal exchange-rate policy with optimal capital-control taxes
(Definition 1) the following conditions hold at all dates and states:
• If ξ < 1, (h− ht) (d (ht, cTt , yTt )− dt+1) = 0.
• If ξ ≥ 1, ht = h.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Two conclusions follow from this result. First, the allocation under the optimal exchange-
rate policy and capital-control taxes features no unemployment under no binding collateral
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constraints. Given that the capital-control tax eliminates any inefficient borrowing, elim-
inating unemployment when the credit constraint does not bind leads to a welfare gain
(a higher consumption of nontradables), without any welfare cost.8
Second, if the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is less than one, a slackness
condition is established between unemployment and the collateral constraint under the
optimal exchange-rate policy: If the collateral constraint is not binding, the labor market
must exhibit full employment, and if there is unemployment, the collateral constraint
must be binding. As discussed at the end of this section, empirical evidence from EMs
provides wide support for the intratemporal elasticity of substitution being less than one.
To understand the role of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution and the interaction
between unemployment and the collateral constraint under the optimal exchange-rate
policy, a discussion is in order regarding the trade-off facing exchange-rate policy in this
economy.
3.2.1 The Credit-Access–Unemployment Trade-off
Parallel to the traditional inflation–unemployment trade-off in the New Keynesian litera-
ture, the exchange-rate policy in this economy may face a “credit-access–unemployment”
trade-off. Under binding nominal downward wage rigidity, a depreciation of the nomi-
nal exchange rate decreases real wages and, thus, helps reduce unemployment. But it
is also associated with a real exchange-rate depreciation, which decreases the value of
nontradable output in tradable units. Recall that the collateral in this economy is given
by the value, in tradable units, of tradable and nontradable output. Accordingly, if the
price effect (real exchange-rate depreciation) dominates the quantity effect (employment
increase), an exchange-rate depreciation can decrease the collateral value and tighten the
credit limit. The price effect dominates the quantity effect if the intratemporal elasticity
of substitution between tradables and nontradables is less than one (ξ < 1). As discussed
in the next section, this assumption is widely supported by empirical evidence from EMs.
Under this assumption, the following proposition can be established:




, for any debt level d∗t+1 with asso-




t − dt + yTt
)
> 0 for which d∗t+1 > d
(
h, cT∗t , yTt
)
,




for which d∗t+1 = d
(
h∗t , cT∗t , yTt
)
.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
This result shows that for any debt level that does not satisfy the credit limit under
full employment, there exists a level of employment below full employment for which
the real exchange rate is sufficiently appreciated to ensure the credit limit is satisfied for
8Note that while the presence of incomplete financial markets leads to inefficient consumption fluctu-
ations relative to an economy with complete asset markets, eliminating unemployment does not lead to
more inefficient consumption fluctuations.
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that debt level. This result stems from the fact that if the intratemporal elasticity of
substitution is less than one (ξ < 1), the collateral constraint is decreasing in the level of
employment.9 This provides a theoretical justification for the existence of the exchange-
rate policy debate, typically observed during financial crises in EMs, that weighs the two
policy objectives. The optimal choice under this trade-off can be characterized using the
first-order conditions of the optimal policy problem (19):
Remark 1 If ξ < 1, in an allocation under the optimal exchange-rate policy with optimal



















where φµt , and φ
F
t denote the nonnegative multipliers associated with the collateral con-
straint (18), and the resource constraint (17), respectively, in the Ramsey problem of
optimal exchange-rate policy with optimal capital-control taxes.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Equation (24) shows that in any optimal allocation in which there is unemployment, the
Ramsey planner equates the marginal benefit of increasing employment, given by the
marginal utility of nontradable consumption, to its marginal cost in terms of tightening
the collateral constraint. Equation (25) shows that the shadow price of relaxing the
credit constraint for the Ramsey planner, φµt , is the wedge between the current shadow
value of wealth for the Ramsey planner and the expected value of reallocating wealth to
the next period. This shows a relevant aspect of the trade-off involved in exchange-rate
policy: While the costs of exchange-rate depreciations are associated with intertemporal
misallocation of consumption, their benefits are related to a higher level of consumption.
3.2.2 Empirical Evidence on the Intratemporal Elasticity of Substitution
As shown in Propositions 1 and 2, a tension exists between credit access and unem-
ployment only if the elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods
is less than one (ξ < 1). If this is the case, tradable and nontradable goods are gross
complements, and the price effect (real exchange-rate depreciation) associated with in-
creasing employment dominates the quantity effect (employment increase). As a result,
9If the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is greater than or equal to one (ξ ≥ 1), the credit
access–unemployment trade-off vanishes, as implied by Proposition 1. In particular, if the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution is equal to one (ξ = 1), employment does not influence the collateral constraint.
If the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is greater than one (ξ > 1), the credit-access–unemployment
trade-off overturns, and a decrease in unemployment also helps relax the collateral constraint.
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exchange-rate depreciation can decrease the collateral value and make the credit limit
tighter.
There is wide support from the empirical literature for the intratemporal elasticity
of substitution being less than one. In a sample of developed and emerging market
economies, Stockman and Tesar (1995) estimate a value of the elasticity of substitution
of 0.44. Separating the samples of developed and emerging economies, Mendoza (1995)
finds values of the elasticity of 0.74 and 0.43, respectively. In studies for EMs, Gonzalez-
Rozada et al. (2004) found estimates in the range between 0.4 and 0.48 for Argentina
and Lorenzo, Aboal, and Osimani (2005), found estimates in a range between 0.46 and
0.75 for Uruguay.10
Moreover, following this empirical literature, the studies referenced in the present
paper that calibrate a two-sector, small open economy model generally use a parameter
value of the elasticity of substitution in the range between 0.44 and 0.83.
4 Quantitative Analysis
The objective of this section is to quantitatively characterize the aggregate dynamics of the
model economy under the optimal exchange-rate policy and to compare its performance,
in terms of welfare, to that under the full-employment and fixed exchange-rate policies,
both during periods of financial crises and under regular business-cycle fluctuations.
4.1 Calibration and Computation
To characterize the aggregate dynamics under the different exchange-rate regimes, cal-
ibrated versions of the functional equations (19), (21) and (23) are solved numerically.
Due to the presence of occasionally binding constraints, I resort to the method of value-
function iteration over a discretized state-space to compute the numerical solutions.
As mentioned in Section 2, the consumption aggregator is assumed to be a CES





F (h) = hα
N
. (26)
The model is calibrated at the annual frequency, to match Argentinean data. Ar-
gentina is used as a benchmark to conduct this exercise as an EM country whose exchange-
rate regimes and financial crises have been widely studied, particularly in the two branches
of the literature this paper combines.
10Ostry and Reinhart (1992) found evidence inconclusive in this respect with estimates between 0.66
and 1.44, depending on the EM region and the instrumental variable considered. For a survey on the
methodologies used to estimate the elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods, see
Akinci (2011).
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Table 1. Baseline Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description
σ 2 Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution
ξ 0.44 Intratemporal elasticity of substitution
a 0.295 Share of tradables
β 0.8 Annual subjective discount factor
κ 0.263 Share of income used as collateral
αN 0.75 Labor share in nontradable sector
γ 0.96 Degree of downward nominal rigidity
All parameter values used in the baseline calibration are shown in Table 1. The
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set to σ = 2, a standard value in
the business-cycle literature for small open economies (see, for example, Mendoza 1991).
The intratemporal elasticity of substitution is set to ξ = 0.44, using the estimates of
Gonzalez-Rozada et al. (2004) for Argentina (see Section 3.2 for a review of the literature
on this parameter). I set αN = 0.75, following the evidence in Uribe (1997) on the labor
share in the nontradable sector in Argentina, and γ = 0.96, following the evidence in
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011) on downward nominal wage rigidity. The mean level of
tradable output and the labor endowment (h) are normalized to one.
The parameters {β, a, κ} are used to match three key moments in the ergodic dis-
tributions of the model under the optimal exchange-rate policy to the ones observed in
historical Argentinean data (for the period 1975–2011). The three data moments consid-
ered are typically targeted in the related literature (following Bianchi, 2011): an average
level of external debt-to-GDP ratio of 21 percent, a share of tradable output in GDP of
32.9 percent, and a frequency of sudden stops of 5.5 percent. A sudden stop in the model
is defined as a period in which the economy exhibits a change in the current account
larger than one standard deviation, following Eichengreen, Gupta and Mody (2006), from
which the frequency of sudden stops is obtained for a sample of EMs.11 (See the Data
appendix for further details on data sources, and on the construction of the series). The
parameter values obtained from this calibration are β = 0.8, a = 0.295 and κ = 0.263.
Section 5.1 studies the sensitivity of the optimal policy to this calibration.
It is assumed that the two exogenous driving forces, the tradable endowment and the
























]′ ∼ i.i.d. N (∅,Ω) and R denotes the mean interest rate level.
11The frequency for EMs is similar to the frequency in Argentina during this period, and to other
empirical estimates, such as Calvo et al. (2008).
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The parameters of this stochastic process are estimated using Argentinean data since
1983. Tradable endowment is measured with the cyclical component of value added in
agriculture and manufacturing. Interest rates on external debt are measured as the sum
of EMBI spreads and the Treasury-bill rate. (Section 5.2 studies an economy with interest
rate shocks calibrated to those of the risk-free rate). Since the data on EMBI spreads
for Argentina is available since 1994, the series were extended back to 1983, using the
Neumeyer and Perri (2005) dataset, which uses a measure similar to the one considered
here. The interest rate series is then deflated with a measure of expected dollar inflation.
(See the Data appendix for further details on data sources, and on the construction
of tradable endowment and interest rates.) The years 2002–2005, in which Argentina
defaulted and was excluded from international markets (Cruces and Trebesch, 2013), are











, R̂ = 1.113.
This process is approximated with a Markov chain, setting a grid of 15 equally spaced









, yielding 225 exogenous states. To estimate the
transition-probability matrix, I use the method proposed by Terry and Knoteck (2011)
extending Tauchen (1986).12
Finally, to approximate the aggregate dynamics of the economy under the optimal
and the full-employment policies, I discretize the endogenous state space (dt) using 1,001
equally spaced points. To approximate the dynamics under a currency peg, I use 251
equally spaced points for debt (dt) and 250 equally spaced points for the log of previous
period wage (wt−1). The next sections present the results of the quantitative analysis.
4.2 Policy Functions
This section analyzes the policy functions under the optimal exchange-rate policy and
compares them to those under the two benchmark exchange-rate regimes: full-employment
and fixed exchange rate.
Figure 1 shows decision rules for the nominal devaluation rate, the real exchange
rate, unemployment, and next-period debt as a function of the state variables: current
debt, tradable endowment, and the external interest rate. In each panel, only one state
variable varies (on the horizontal axis), and the remaining state variables are fixed at their
unconditional means (under the optimal policy, if the state is endogenous). In each panel,
a shaded region depicts the state-space in which the collateral constraint binds under the
optimal policy. The panels on the right do not have a shaded region since varying the
12I am grateful to Stephen J. Terry and Edward S. Knotek II for sharing the code for the Markov-
chain approximations of vector autoregressions, which were used in this paper to estimate the transition-
probability matrix of the stochastic process.
18
interest rate – while keeping the rest of the states fixed at their respective means – is not
sufficient to make the collateral constraint bind.
The decision rules for the nominal devaluation rate and real exchange rate under
the optimal policy are nonmonotonic, in sharp contrast with the decision rules under
the full-employment or fixed exchange-rate policies. The change of the sign in the slope
under the optimal policy occurs at the point at which a higher initial level of debt or a
lower tradable endowment entails a binding credit constraint. In the region of nonbinding
collateral constraint, the decision rules of optimal and full-employment policies coincide,
as implied by Proposition 1. In this region, currency depreciation is increasing in the
initial debt level and the interest rate, and decreasing in the level of tradable endowment.
In the region of binding collateral constraint, while currency depreciation in the full-
employment policy continues to be increasing in the initial debt level and decreasing in
the level of tradable endowment, currency depreciation under the optimal exchange-rate
policy becomes decreasing in the initial debt level and increasing in the level of tradable
endowment. Positive unemployment emerges under the optimal exchange-rate policy
in the region of binding collateral constraint, increasing in the initial level of debt and
decreasing in the level of tradable endowment.
The decision rule for next-period debt under the optimal policy is monotonic, as it
would be without an endogenous collateral constraint. Again in sharp contrast, under the
full-employment policy, the decision rule for next-period debt is nonmonotonic, with a
change in the slope at the point at which a higher initial level of debt or a lower tradable
endowment implies a binding credit constraint (for a similar result in an endowment
economy, see Bianchi, 2011). Hence, consistent with Proposition 2, the optimal policy
restores the monotonicity in the policy functions of debt by making the decision rule
of the real exchange rate nonmonotonic. In other words, the optimal choice under the
credit-access–unemployment trade-off implies no corner solution: the optimal policy is
willing to choose unemployment in the region of binding collateral constraint to allow for
a higher next-period debt.
The decision rules for the currency peg show that this regime, in contrast to the
optimal and full-employment policies, implies positive unemployment in the state-space
regions in which the collateral constraint does not bind. In these regions, the fixed
exchange-rate regime makes the downward rate rigidity binding. Consistent with this,
the decision rule of the real exchange rate under the currency peg displays less sensitivity
than that of the other two exchange-rate regimes.
4.3 Optimal Exchange-Rate Policy during Financial Crises
Under no binding collateral constraints, the optimal exchange-rate policy always con-
sists of depreciating the nominal exchange rate in response to negative shocks to achieve














































































































Figure 1. Policy Functions. Note: The real exchange rate is expressed in log deviations from its
sample mean. Devaluation rate, unemployment rate and next-period debt are expressed in levels. In each
panel, only one state variable varies (on the horizontal axis), and the remaining state variables are fixed at
their unconditional means (under the optimal policy, if the state is endogenous). Shaded regions denote
regions of the state-space in which the collateral constraint binds under the optimal policy.
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exchange-rate policy under periods of binding collateral constraints, or financial crises,
and compares the dynamics of the economy under the different exchange-rate regimes.
To do this, the calibrated version of the model is simulated for 2 million quarters, iden-
tifying periods in which the collateral constraint is binding under the optimal exchange-
rate policy. The beginning of a financial crisis episode (t = 0) is defined as the first
period in which the collateral constraint binds. The responses of the variables, during all
episodes of financial crisis, are then averaged.
Figure 2 depicts the average external shock during a financial-crisis episode. In the
two years that precede such an episode, tradable endowment contracts and interest rates
increase. At the crisis trough (t = 0), tradable output is 10 percent below its mean,
and the annual interest rate is 16 percent, 4 percentage points above its mean. In the
three years following the trough, both tradable output and the interest rate recover their
precrisis levels.









































Figure 2. Financial Crises – Exogenous Variables.
The average responses of the nominal exchange rate and endogenous variables under
the different exchange-rate regimes are shown in Figure 3. Optimal and full-employment
exchange-rate policies display striking similarities and offer a sharp contrast to the re-
sponse under a currency peg. Even under binding collateral constraints (t = 0), the
optimal exchange-rate policy does not fix but it substantially depreciates the nominal
exchange rate, 52 percent on average. This depreciation is less than that under the full-
employment policy (71 percent). As a result, some involuntary unemployment emerges
under binding collateral constraints (1.6 percent on average at the crisis trough). How-
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ever, unemployment under the optimal exchange-rate policy is significantly lower than
that observed under the currency peg (6.2 percent on average at the crisis trough).










































































Figure 3. Financial Crises – Endogenous Variables. Note: Real exchange rate, real wage, and
external debt expressed in log deviations from their sample means. Current account expressed in deviations
of its sample mean. Devaluation rate and unemployment rate expressed in levels.
In periods of binding collateral constraints, the large real-exchange-rate depreciation
under the optimal exchange-rate policy (the relative price of nontradable goods being
39 percent below its mean at the crisis trough), implies a large adjustment of external
debt and tradable consumption. Under the optimal policy, the contraction of tradable
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consumption is much larger than the contraction in nontradable consumption: at the
crisis trough, tradable consumption is 20.8 percent below its mean, while nontradable
consumption is only 1.2 percent below its mean. The intuition for this result is that while
the benefits of reducing unemployment are related to higher nontradable consumption
(by market clearing of nontradables) its costs are related to intertemporal miscallocation
of consumption. In this sense, sudden stops (understood as large current-account ad-
justments), are in fact part of the endogenous response to large negative external shocks
under the optimal exchange-rate policy to prevent greater unemployment. This is again
in sharp contrast to the behavior under the currency peg, where, for the same exoge-
nous shock, external debt continues increasing and the current-account deficit expands;
at the crisis trough, tradable consumption is 7.6 percent below its mean and nontradable
consumption 4.2 percent below its mean.
The large, but still contained, optimal currency depreciation during periods of financial
crises is consistent, for instance, with the typical behavior observed in EMs during the
global financial turbulence of 2008 (see Figure 4). During this episode, EMs considerably
depreciate the exchange rate (24 percent on average), but also contain the depreciation,
as can be observed in the fall in international reserves. Calvo (2013) shows that this
pattern of large nominal depreciation (more than 20 percent on average) with simultaneous
exchange-rate intervention is the typical policy observed in EMs during periods of sudden
stops since 1980.
4.4 Means and Volatilities by Exchange-Rate Regime
Table 2 shows that the differences between the optimal and full-employment policies dur-
ing periods of binding collateral constraint (analyzed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3) translate, on
the one hand, into a lower volatility of tradable consumption and total consumption, and,
on the other hand, into a higher average unemployment rate. This reflects the fact that,
under binding collateral constraints, the optimal policy allows for lowering nontradable
consumption to improve intertemporal allocation of consumption. The differences in first
and second moments between optimal and full-employment policies are slight since the
unconditional probability of binding collateral constraints is low (1.5 percent).
The currency peg displays a larger difference in terms of the average unemployment
rate with respect to the optimal exchange-rate regime. The reason is that, as previously
analyzed, currency pegs also display unemployment when the collateral constraint does
not bind but the wage rigidity does. This response of currency pegs to negative shocks
also results in a higher volatility of nontradable consumption and total consumption with
respect to the other two regimes.
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Figure 4. Exchange-Rate Policy in Emerging Market Economies – Lehman Episode.
Note: Nominal exchange rate and international reserves figures were computed as the simple average
for the countries included in the EMBI, except countries with no separate legal tender (Ecuador, El
Salvador, and Panama). The countries included in the sample are Algeria, Argentina, Belarus, Belize,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic,
Egypt, Gabon, Georgia, Hungary, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Lebanon, Lithuania,
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia,
Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay,
Venezuela, and Vietnam. Data sources: See Data appendix.
4.5 Welfare and Exchange-Rate Regimes
This section compares welfare under the different exchange-rate regimes. The welfare costs
of an exchange-rate regime i with respect to an exchange-rate regime j are computed as
the percentage increase in the consumption stream under exchange-rate regime i that will
make the representative household indifferent between that consumption stream and the
one under the exchange-rate regime j. Formally, the compensation rate under the regime








1 + λi,j (st)









where i, j ∈ {OP,FE,PEG}.
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Table 2. Means and Volatilities
by Exchange Rate Regime
OP FE CP
Means
µ(c) 0.98 0.98 0.98
µ(cT ) 0.94 0.94 0.95
µ(cN ) 1.00 1.00 0.99
µ(p) 2.09 2.09 2.16
µ(u) 0.04 0.0 0.8
µ(d) 0.64 0.64 0.52
Volatilities
σ(c) 2.86 2.89 3.0
σ(cT ) 8.3 8.4 5.8
σ(cN ) 0.4 0 2.3
σ(p) 40.7 41.3 25.3
σ(u) 0.5 0.0 2.9
σ(d) 0.04 0.04 0.12
Note: OP, FE and CP denote optimal exchange-rate policy, full-employment exchange-rate policy, and
currency peg, respectively, as defined in Section 3. The variables c, cT , cN , p, u, and d, denote, re-
spectively, consumption, tradable consumption, nontradable consumption, relative price of nontradables,
unemployment rate, and external debt. Volatilities and mean unemployment expressed in percent. Mo-
ments computed using parameters from Table 1.




















Since welfare costs are state dependent, Figure 5 begins by showing the welfare costs
of the full-employment and fixed exchange-rate policies, with respect to the optimal
exchange-rate policy, as functions of the states, and the welfare cost of the fixed exchange-
rate policy, with respect to the full-employment exchange-rate policy, as a function of the
states. As in Figure 1, in each panel only one state variable varies (on the horizontal
axis), and the remaining state variables are fixed at their unconditional means (under the
optimal policy, if the state is endogenous). In each panel, a shaded region show where in
the state space the collateral constraint binds under the optimal policy. As in Figure 1,
the panels on the right do not have a shaded region since varying the interest rate – while
keeping the rest of the states fixed at their respective means– is not sufficient to make the
collateral constraint bind.
The welfare costs of the full-employment policy with respect to the optimal policy are
increasing in the initial debt level, and decreasing in the level of tradable endowment and
25
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Figure 5. Welfare Costs by State. Note: the welfare costs of an exchange-rate regime i with respect
to an exchange-rate regime j are defined as the percentage increase in the consumption stream under
exchange-rate regime i that will make the representative household indifferent between that consumption
stream and that under the exchange-rate regime j in a given state. In each panel, only one state variable
varies (on the horizontal axis); the remaining state variables are fixed at their unconditional means (under
the optimal policy, if the state is endogenous). Shaded regions denote regions of the state-space in which
the collateral constraint binds under the optimal policy.
the interest rate. Welfare costs of the full-employment policy are significantly higher in
the regions of the state space in which the collateral constraint binds. The higher welfare
costs of the full-employment policy in this region stem from the fact that in these states,
the decision rules from the optimal policy differ from those of the full-employment policy,
implying a looser credit limit, as shown in the study of the policy functions in Section
4.2. This suggests that the welfare costs of the full-employment policy are decreasing in
the interest rate because a higher interest rate leads to a reduction in the shadow value
from relaxing the constraint.
The welfare costs of the currency peg with respect to the optimal and full-employment
policies are nonmonotonic. In the region of nonbinding collateral constraint, welfare
costs are decreasing in the level of endowment, and for high levels of debt or interest
rates, welfare costs are increasing in the initial debt level and the interest rate. The
intuition is that in the region of nonbinding collateral constraint, while the optimal policy
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Table 3. Welfare Costs by Exchange-Rate Regime
Welfare Costs of: Full-Employment Policy Currency Peg Currency Peg
with respect to: Optimal Policy Optimal Policy Full-Employment Policy
Mean 0.006 0.576 0.568
Standard Deviation 0.023 0.324 0.325
Maximum 2.7 5.065 5.063
Minimum 0.001 0.22 −1.71
Note: welfare costs expressed in percent. The welfare costs of an exchange-rate regime i with respect
to an exchange-rate regime j are defined as the percentage increase in the consumption stream under
exchange-rate regime i that will make the representative household indifferent between that consumption
stream and the one under the exchange-rate regime j in a given state.
maintains full-employment (Proposition 1), the currency peg displays a positive level
of unemployment, which is increasing in the initial debt level and the interest rate, and
decreasing in the tradable endowment (see Section 4.2). In the regions where the collateral
constraint binds, the welfare costs of the unemployment generated by the currency peg
are increasing in the initial debt level and decreasing in the level of tradable endowment.
The intuition is that, in this region, the optimal policy displays a positive unemployment,
which, as shown in Section 4.2, is increasing in the debt level and decreasing in tradable
endowment.
Table 3 shows the moment of the distribution of welfare costs and indicates that the
average welfare costs of the full-employment policy with respect to the optimal policy
(0.006 percent) are significantly lower than the welfare costs of the currency peg with
respect to the optimal policy (0.58 percent).13
Finally, Figure 6 shows welfare costs during financial crisis episodes (as defined in
Section 4.3). It can be observed that financial crises are periods in which the welfare
costs of both the full-employment policy and the currency peg increase. The size of the
increase in the welfare costs of the full-employment policy are, again, much smaller than
the increase in the welfare costs of currency pegs: At the crisis trough the welfare costs of
the full-employment and currency peg policies, with respect to the optimal exchange-rate
policy, are 0.06 percent and 1.83 percent, respectively. As a consequence, the welfare
costs of the currency peg with respect to the full-employment exchange-rate regime also
rise during financial crises, reaching 1.77 percent at the crisis trough, meaning that cur-
rency pegs are particularly costly in terms of welfare during periods of binding collateral
constraints.
13Formally, the mean of the welfare costs of an exchange-rate regime i with respect to an exchange-rate










where pii(st) denotes the unconditional probability of state st under exchange-rate regime i.
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Figure 6. Welfare Costs During Financial Crises. Note: The welfare costs of an exchange-
rate regime i with respect to an exchange-rate regime j are defined as the percentage increase in the
consumption stream under exchange-rate regime i that will make the representative household indifferent
between that consumption stream and the one under the exchange-rate regime j in a given state. See
Section 4.3 for the definition of a financial crisis episode.
4.6 Data and Model Predictions
This subsection compares the data with the predictions of the model, during both financial
crises and regular business cycles. Although the structure of the model is relatively simple,
several features of the data are in line with the predictions of the model, as in previous
literature using similar model structures. The predictions of the model are compared
with data from Argentina, the economy for which the model economy was calibrated.
Figure 7 illustrates the fact that Argentina, as did most EMs, alternated between different
exchange-rate regimes during the period of study (Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff, 2010).
For this reason, the predictions of the three exchange-rate regimes are relevant to a
comparison of the data.
Figure 8 shows that, in most dimensions, the dynamics of the average sudden stop
episode in the data is within the predictions of the model during a financial crisis episode
(as defined in Section 4.3).14 The average episode in the data is constructed using three
14Nominal exchange rates and external debt were excluded from the comparison due to hyperinflation
episodes and default episodes that occurred in some of these periods (for hyperinflation episodes, see
Sargent, Williams, and Zha, 2009; for default episodes, see Cruces and Trebesch, 2013).
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Figure 7. Exchange-Rate Regimes in Argentina and Emerging Market Economies. Note: Data
on exchange-rate regimes from Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2010). Classification codes: 1. No separate
legal tender, preannounced peg or currency board arrangement, preannounced horizontal band that is
narrower than or equal to +/−2 percent, or de facto peg; 2. preannounced crawling peg, preannounced
crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/−2 percent, de facto crawling peg, or de facto crawling
band that is narrower than or equal to +/−2 percent; 3. de facto crawling band that is narrower than or
equal to +/−5 percent, moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/−2 percent, managed floating;
4. freely floating; 5. freely falling; 6. dual market in which parallel-market data is missing.
sudden-stop episodes observed in Argentina in 1982, 1989, and 2001 (Eichengreen, Gupta
and Mody, 2006; Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi, 2006). The current-account reversal, the
real-exchange-rate depreciation, and the contraction in real wages observed in the average
sudden-stop episode in the data are similar in magnitude to the predictions of the model
under the optimal exchange-rate policy. The increase of unemployment in the data is
also within the predictions of the model, between the unemployment predicted by the
currency peg and that predicted under the optimal policy. This can be related to the
fact that, as Figure 7 indicates, sudden-stop episodes are periods of transition between
exchange-rate regimes. A dimension in which the quantitative behavior of the average
sudden-stop episode is not in line with the model is in nontradable-output and consump-
tion. Although the model predicts a significant contraction in these two variables, the
contraction observed in the data is larger. Since the behavior of unemployment in the
data is in line with the predictions of the model, a key factor driving the larger fall in out-
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Model − Optimal Policy
Model − Currency Peg
Data
Figure 8. Financial Crises – Model and Data. Note: Real exchange rate, real wage, real GDP and
consumption expressed in log deviations from their sample means in the model, and from a log quadratic
trend in the data. Current-account-to-GDP ratio expressed in deviations from its sample mean in the
model and from a quadratic trend in the data. Unemployment rate expressed in levels in the model, and
in deviation from t− 2 values in the data. See Section 4.3 for the definition of a financial crisis episode.
Data sources: see Data appendix.
put in the data is the contraction in measured total factor productivity (TFP), typically
observed during sudden stop episodes (see Calvo et al., 2006). In particular, the average
sudden stop episode in the data displays a contraction in measured TFP of 7 percent.15
15Data on measured TFP for Argentina obtained from Aravena and Fuentes (2013). I am grateful to
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However, to maintain a simple structure, the model does not feature TFP shocks in the
nontradable sector, or an endogenous propagation mechanism that shows up as measured
TFP (e.g., capacity utilization, as in Gertler et al., 2007, or imported intermediate inputs
as in Mendoza and Yue, 2012).
Table 4 shows that, in several dimensions, the second moments observed in the Argen-
tinean data are in line with the second moments predicted by the model. The observed
standard deviations of the unemployment rate, the real wage and the real exchange rate
are in line with those predicted by the model. The data is closer to the predictions of the
model under a currency peg, which can be related to the fact that, as illustrated in Figure
7, in more than 60 percent of the periods since 1980, Argentina was under either a peg
or a narrow crawling peg. The model also captures that consumption volatility exceeds
output volatility, which is a key feature of EM business cycles (Aguiar and Gopinath,
2007; Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe, 2014). The ratio of standard volatility of consumption
to standard volatility of output observed in the data is 1.1, close to the 1.2 predicted
under a currency peg. Despite the fact that the volatility of unemployment in the data
is similar to the volatility predicted by the model, the volatility of output in the data is
significantly higher than the volatility of output predicted by the model. Similar to what
was discussed for sudden-stop episodes in the previous paragraph, the higher volatility
of output in the data, with respect to the model, can be explained by measured TFP: If
the variations in the Solow residual observed in the data are extracted from output, the
volatility of output in Argentina in the period of study decreases to 1.9 percent, which is
in line with the predictions of the model.
Another relevant dimension observed in the data for Argentina, and in general for
EMs, which is qualitatively captured by the model is the countercyclical trade balance
(Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007; Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe, 2014). However, the correlation
of the trade balance with output observed in the data is less in absolute value than the
one predicted by the model. Since the correlation with net factor income from abroad is
strongly procyclical both in the data and in the model, the model predicts a procyclical
current account. As discussed in Benigno et al. (2012a), an element that could make the
model predict a more countercyclical trade balance and current account is the presence
of investment (see, for example, Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland, 1993). For the rest of the
variables, the correlations with output observed in the data are in line with those predicted
by the model. Finally, the autocorrelations observed in the data are also consistent with
those predicted by the model. For output, consumption, unemployment, trade balance
and the current account, the autocorrelation coefficient observed in the data are higher
than those predicted by the model, while the correlation coefficient of the real wage and
the real exchange rate observed in the data are within the model’s predictions.
Claudio Aravena for sharing the data on measured TFP.
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σ(Y ) 8.2 1.6 1.5 2.6
σ(C)/σ(Y ) 1.1 1.8 1.9 1.2
σ(u) 3.2 0.5 0.0 2.9
σ(p) 19.2 40.7 41.3 25.3
σ(w) 23.3 30.5 31.0 17.3
σ(TB/Y ) 2.8 2.0 2.1 1.6
σ(CA/Y ) 2.8 1.4 1.5 1.6
Correlations with output
ρ(C, Y ) 98.6 75.2 72.8 86.3
ρ(u, Y ) -23.0 -28.5 - -81.1
ρ(p, Y ) 76.3 77.8 78.8 54.3
ρ(w, Y ) 78.5 77.7 78.8 51.8
ρ(TB/Y, Y ) -95.5 -29.6 -28.6 -6.4
ρ(CA/Y, Y ) -88.3 7.9 7.8 41.0
Autocorrelations
ρ(Yt, Yt−1) 74.9 55.3 57.3 49.1
ρ(Ct, Ct−1) 74.9 36.0 33.6 53.0
ρ(ut, ut−1) 75.3 8.7 - 27.5
ρ(pt, pt−1) 68.1 43.3 41.4 83.8
ρ(wt, wt−1) 62.3 43.3 41.4 87.9
ρ(TBt/Yt, TBt−1/Yt−1) 70.2 10.3 5.5 46.7
ρ(CAt/Yt, CAt−1/Yt−1) 56.5 -12.9 -16.7 33.7
Note: Values expressed in percent. OP, FE and CP denote optimal exchange-rate policy, full-employment
exchange-rate policy, and currency peg, respectively, as defined in Section 3. The variables Y , C, TB,
and CA denote, respectively, output, consumption, trade balance, and current account, expressed in real
terms; the variables u, p, and w denote, respectively, unemployment rate, relative price of nontradables,
wages in units of tradables. Moments in the data were computed for the period 1980–2011. Variables in
the data were quadratically detrended. Moments predicted by the model were computed using parameters
from Table 1. Data sources: see Data appendix.
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5 Sensitivity Analysis and Extensions
This section studies how the characterization of the optimal exchange-rate policy during
financial crises is affected by alternative parametrizations of the model, alternative shocks,
and alternative modeling assumptions.
5.1 Parameter values
This section shows that the main conclusions regarding the characterization of the optimal
exchange-rate policy during financial crises are robust to alternative parameter values. In
particular, Figure 9 shows the average values of nominal exchange-rate depreciation, real
exchange rate, unemployment, and tradable consumption under the optimal exchange-rate
policy during periods in which the collateral constraint binds for alternative parameter
values. The focus is on financial crises since, as shown in Proposition 1, periods of
nonbinding collateral constraint are always characterized by full employment under the
optimal exchange-rate policy, independent of parameter values.
I begin by studying alternative values for the intratemporal elasticity of substitution,
considering values in the range used in the literature, between ξ = 0.4 and ξ = 0.83 (see
Section 3.2 for a survey). The value of this parameter used in the baseline calibration
is ξ = 0.44, following the estimates of Gonzalez-Rozada et al. (2004) for Argentina.
As explained in Section 3.2, this parameter determines the extent to which exchange-
rate depreciations decrease collateral values. If ξ ≥ 1, there is no negative effect of a
currency depreciation on collateral values, and the optimal policy is always to achieve
full employment. As expected from this, Figure 9 indicates that the higher the value
of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution, the lower the unemployment rate under
the optimal exchange-rate policy. In this sense, the conclusions obtained in the baseline
calibration are conservative with respect to this parameter value: A higher intratemporal
elasticity of substitution would imply an optimal policy even closer to full employment.
I then study alternative values for κ, the parameter that governs the collateral con-
straint. To the best of my knowledge, there is no empirical estimate available of this
parameter. In the baseline calibration this parameter was set to κ = 0.263 to match the
probability of sudden stops. I now consider alternative values for the collateral parameter
ranging from κ = 0.2 (average debt-to-GDP ratio in Argentinean data) to κ = 0.645 (max-
imum debt-to-GDP ratio in Argentinean data). Results in Figure 9 indicate that, in this
range of parameter values, the higher the collateral parameter, the lower the depreciation
rate under the optimal exchange-rate policy, and the higher resulting unemployment and
tradable consumption. The difference is nontrivial: for instance, with a value of κ = 0.645
the average depreciation rate in a period of financial crisis is 10.3 percent and the resulting
unemployment rate, 5.3 percent (which compares to 1.6 percent in the baseline scenario).
The intuition for this result is that, the higher the collateral parameter, the higher the


















































































































Figure 9. Sensitivity of Optimal Policy during Financial Crises. Note: Figures denote the
value of each variable at the trough (t = 0) of the average financial crisis episode. See Section 4.3 for the
definition of a financial crisis episode.
the higher the benefits of containing depreciation. However, even in this case, it can be
observed that the optimal policy features a large real exchange-rate depreciation during
financial crises (a 24 percent fall in the relative price of nontradable goods), implying that
it is optimal to contract tradable consumption more than nontradable consumption and
employment.
In the third place, I study the sensitivity, of the optimal policy during financial crises,
with respect to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In the baseline calibration, the
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution was set to σ = 2, a standard value in
the business-cycle literature. Since, as studied in Section 3.2, the benefits of credit-market
access are related to the intertemporal allocation of consumption, this is a key parameter
in the optimal exchange-rate policy. The range of values of the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution consider is from σ = 2 to σ = 5, the value estimated in Reinhart
and Vegh (1995) for Argentina. Results for this range of parameter values are shown
in Figure 9. As expected, a lower intertemporal elasticity of substitution is associated
with a lower optimal exchange-rate depreciation during financial crises. Quantitatively,
the conclusions are similar to those obtained in the baseline calibration. For instance,
for σ = 5 the optimal policy in financial crises is a large nominal and real exchange-rate
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depreciation of 35 percent.
Finally, it worth mentioning that γ, the degree of wage rigidity, does not affect the
allocation under the optimal exchange-rate policy, except for the value of the optimal
nominal depreciation rate, t. This can be seen from the fact that γ does not enter in the







der the optimal exchange-rate policy. It follows that the real exchange-rate depreciation,
under the optimal exchange-rate policy, does not depend on γ either. The only variable
under the optimal exchange-rate policy that is affected by γ is the nominal exchange-rate
depreciation: the lower the γ, the lower the average nominal exchange-rate depreciation
required to implement the optimal allocation during a financial crisis episode, as illus-
trated in Figure 9.
In summary, the main findings regarding the optimal exchange-rate policy during fi-
nancial crises in previous sections are robust with respect to alternative values of structural
parameters: The optimal exchange-rate policy implies, on average, large real exchange-
rate depreciations during financial crises; this is achieved by depreciating the nominal
exchange rate, and implies a relatively small increase in the unemployment rate as com-
pared to the decline in tradable consumption.
5.2 Stochastic structure
The baseline quantitative analysis (Section 4) includes interest rate shocks, and uses the
contractual interest rate to calibrate these shocks. This section considers instead three
alternative stochastic structures: i) an economy with interest-rate shocks calibrated to
those of the risk-free rate; ii) an economy with no interest-rate shocks; and iii) an economy
with no interest rate shocks but shocks to the parameter κ, that governs the collateral
constraint. These sensitivity analyses are important because, in the presence of credit
constraints, calibrating the model using the EM’s contractual interest rate (as in the
baseline calibration), which incorporates default risk, could lead to overestimating the
costs of borrowing during crises. It is shown that the optimal policy under these alterna-
tive stochastic structures still features large nominal and real exchange-rate depreciations
during financial crises (between 20 and 25 percent). However, since higher interest rates
lead to a lower shadow value from relaxing the credit constraint, the optimal currency
depreciation under these stochastic structures is half of that under the baseline stochastic
structure.
The first case considers an economy with interest-rate shocks calibrated to those of the
risk-free rate. As in the baseline calibration, it is assumed that the two exogenous driving
forces – tradable endowment and interest rate – follow a first-order VAR of the form in
(27), with the risk-free rate taking the place of the country’s interest rate. The risk-free
rate is measured by a US real interest rate (Treasury-bill rate, deflated with a measure
of expected dollar inflation, constructed as detailed in the Data appendix). Following
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Uribe and Yue (2006), I assume that the risk-free rate follows a univariate process (i.e.,
Φ21 = 0). The parameters of the stochastic process are estimated for the same period and
using the same methodology as in the baseline calibration. The parameters {β, a, κ} are
used, as in the baseline calibration, to match the average level of external debt-to-GDP
ratio, the share of tradable output in GDP, and the frequency of sudden stops observed
in the data. All the rest of the parameters are set as in the baseline calibration (Table 1).
The second case considers an economy with no interest-rate shocks. In this economy,
tradable endowment shocks are the only source of uncertainty and are assumed to follow
the same stochastic process as in the baseline calibration. The fixed gross interest rate is
set to 1.018, the average US real interest rate from 1980 to 2011. Again, as in the baseline
calibration, the parameters {β, a, κ} are used to match the average level of external debt-
to-GDP ratio, the share of tradable output in GDP, and the frequency of sudden stops
observed in the data, with all the rest of the parameters set as in the baseline calibration
(Table 1).
Finally, the third case considers an economy with no interest-rate shocks, but instead
with shocks to the parameter κ, that governs the collateral constraint. These types
of shocks have been used in the literature to capture sudden stops driven by shocks
to foreign investors’ confidence in EMs (see, for example, Benigno and Fornaro, 2012;
















where κt follows a first-order Markov process. As is standard in this literature, we assume
for simplicity that κt ∈ {κL, κH}, with κL < κH . The value of κH is set to an arbitrarily
high value such that the collateral constraint never binds in period t if κt = κ
H . Similar to




are used to match the average external
debt-to-GDP ratio, the share of tradable output in GDP, and the frequency of sudden
stops observed in the data. Following Benigno and Fornaro (2012), the probability of
entering a low-collateral-constraint state, denoted piLκ , is set to 0.1 (Jeanne and Ranciere,
2011), and the probability of exiting a low-collateral-constraint state, denoted piHκ , is set
to 0.5 (Alfaro and Kanczuk, 2009). The other parameters are set as in the baseline
calibration (Table 1).
Figure 10 displays the optimal nominal exchange rate and endogenous variables for the
average financial crisis episode (as defined in section 4.3), under the baseline and the three
alternative stochastic structures. The optimal nominal and real exchange-rate depreci-
ation during the average financial crisis episode, under the three alternative stochastic
structures, is between 20 and 25 percent. Thus, independently of the assumption on
the behavior of interest rates during financial crisis episodes, it is optimal to allow for
large currency depreciation, and to induce a relatively small increase in the unemploy-
ment rate compared to the adjustment of tradable consumption. However, the fact that,
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No Interest Rate Shocks
Risk−Free Interest Rate Shocks
κ Shocks
Figure 10. Financial Crises – Optimal Policy under Alternative Stochastic Structures.
Note: Real exchange rate, real wage, and external debt expressed in log deviations from their sample
means. Current account expressed in deviations from its sample mean. Devaluation rate and unemploy-
ment rate expressed in levels. See Section 4.3 for the definition of a financial crisis episode.
under the alternative stochastic structures, currency depreciation is half that under the
baseline structure suggests that the behavior of interest rates during a financial crisis is
key to determining the optimal degree of “fear of floating.” In particular, when a finan-
cial crisis occurs with no significant increase in interest rates, optimal policy calls for a
more contained depreciation, a smaller current-account adjustment and a larger increase
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in unemployment than when the episode occurs with a sizable increase of interest rates.
5.3 Model structure
This section studies the characterization of optimal exchange-rate policy after relaxing
two assumptions of the baseline model: endowment in the tradable sector and inelastic
labor supply.
5.3.1 Production in the Tradable Sector
This subsection relaxes the baseline model’s assumption of tradable endowment and in-
stead considers production in the tradable sector. This a relevant modification to study
since, as shown in Benigno et al. (2012a), labor reallocation is an important mechanism
in dealing with financial crises in the presence of a collateral constraint like the one stud-
ied in this paper. To facilitate the reallocation mechanism it will be assumed – in sharp
contrast to the baseline model – that labor is perfectly mobile across sectors.
As in the nontradable sector, production in the tradable sector is now assumed to be
conducted by firms that operate in competitive labor and product markets, each period
hiring labor to produce the tradable good, yTt , and using an isoelastic production function.






αT − wthTt ,
where hTt denotes labor employed in the tradable sector, Z
T
t denotes productivity in the
tradable sector, assumed to be exogenous and stochastic.
The firms’ problem is to choose hTt to maximize profits given prices wt and productivity
ZTt . The first-order condition of this problem is
ZTt α
T (hTt )
αT−1 = wt. (29)
Total hours worked is now given by the sum of hours worked in the tradable sector






The rest of the equilibrium conditions are the same as in the baseline economy. To
calibrate the model, the labor share in the tradable sector is set to αT = 0.5, following
evidence in Uribe (1997). The parameters {β, a, κ} are used, as in the baseline calibration,
to match the average level of external debt-to-GDP ratio, the share of tradable output
in GDP, and the frequency of sudden stops observed in the data. All the rest of the
parameters are set as in the baseline calibration (Table 1). Given the lack of historical
sectoral data on measured TFP for Argentina, and to facilitate comparison with the
baseline calibration, it is assumed that the stochastic process is the same as in (27), with




Figure 11 shows that the optimal exchange-rate policy in the economy with production
in the tradable sector features less unemployment than in the baseline economy. This is
because, in this modified setup, currency depreciations have a larger benefit than in the
baseline economy, to reallocate resources and increase production in the tradable sector.
This increase in tradable production, in turn, reduces the tightening in the collateral
constraint and the required current-account adjustment. Therefore, in equilibrium, even
if currency depreciation is smaller than in the baseline economy, unemployment is also
smaller than that observed in the baseline economy. These results indicate that the degree
of labor mobility across sectors is a key characteristic of the economy for determining the
optimal degree of “fear of floating,” and also the severity of financial crises in terms of
unemployment and current-account adjustment.
5.3.2 Endogenous Labor Supply
In this section, the assumption of inelastic labor supply is relaxed. I assume, instead of




βt (U (ct)− v (ht)) , (31)
where the function v (·) is assumed to be continuous, twice differentiable, strictly increas-
ing and convex.
The first-order condition with respect to hours worked is given by
v′ (hst ) = wtλt, (32)
where hst denotes the number of hours supplied by households to the labor market.
Actual hours worked cannot exceed labor supply, meaning that labor-market condi-
tions (12) and (13) are replaced respectively by




(hst − ht) = 0. (34)
The rest of the equilibrium conditions are the same as in the baseline economy.
To calibrate the model, we assume the functional form




1− θ , (35)
where ϕ > 0 and θ > 0. The values of h and ϕ, are set to 3 and 1.5 to match an
average level of hours worked at unity (to preserve the size of the nontradable sector),
assuming that households at full employment spend one third of their time working.
The value of θ is set to 1.6 which corresponds to an elasticity of labor supply of 1.25,
following the estimates in Mendoza (2010). The parameters {β, a, κ} are used, as in the
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Tradable Production (tp)
Figure 11. Financial Crises – Optimal Policy under Alternative Model Structures. Note:
Real exchange rate, real wage, external debt, and tradable output expressed in log deviations from their
sample means. Current account expressed in deviations from its sample mean. Devaluation rate, unem-
ployment rate, and labor supply expressed in levels. See Section 4.3 for the definition of a financial crisis
episode.
baseline calibration, to match the average level of external debt-to-GDP ratio, the share
of tradable output in GDP, and the frequency of sudden stops observed in the data. The
other parameters are set as in the baseline calibration (Table 1).
Figure 11 shows that the optimal exchange-rate policy in an economy with an endoge-
nous labor supply features significantly more unemployment during financial crises than
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in the baseline economy, showing that labor elasticity is also a relevant characteristic of
the economy for determining the optimal degree of “fear of floating.” The contraction
in the level of employment is greater than in the baseline economy since, in this setup,
decreasing employment has a benefit not only in terms of relaxing the credit constraint,
but also in terms of increasing leisure. However, most of this increase in unemployment
is driven by an increase in the labor supply: Unlike the Ramsey planner, agents do not
incorporate the effect that increasing employment has on tightening the collateral con-
straint, and increase labor supply during financial crises, given the large contraction in
consumption that occurs during these episodes. While currency depreciation is smaller
than in the baseline economy, the optimal allocation is still characterized by a relatively
large real exchange-rate depreciation during financial crises (a 21 percent fall in the rel-
ative price of nontradable goods), implying a relatively small decrease in nontradable
consumption rate compared to that of tradable consumption.
5.4 No Capital-Control Taxes
So far, the paper has characterized the optimal exchange-rate policy as conditional on
the use of an optimal capital-control tax. As discussed in Section 3, this optimal capital-
control tax eliminates any inefficient borrowing that might stem from the collateral con-
straint or from the downward wage rigidity. This section studies the sensitivity of the
optimal policy to this assumption by extending the analysis to the case where the only
instrument available to the Ramsey planner is the nominal exchange rate.
The Ramsey planner is assumed to have access to a commitment technology. Since the
household’s intertemporal optimality condition (6) is part of the set of restrictions, the
Ramsey problem cannot, as in Section 3, be expressed with a standard recursive formu-
lation.16 However, the method developed in Marcet and Marimon (2011) can be applied
to reformulate the nonrecursive problem with forward-looking variables as a recursive
saddle-point problem.17 This approach implies the inclusion of the Lagrange multipliers
associated with forward-looking constraints (in this case, equation (6)) as costate vari-
ables. As shown in Appendix D, using this method the dynamics under the optimal
exchange-rate policy (without capital-control taxes) can be expressed with the recursive
16This problem does not arise when the Ramsey planner has access to an optimal capital-control tax
since, as shown in Appendix A, the capital-control tax can always be picked so that the optimal allocation
satisfies the intertemporal optimality condition (6).
17For related applications of the Marcet and Marimon (2011) method, see Adam and Billi (2005),































































cT , h, µ, φ˜D, φ˜D
′) ≡U (A (cT , F (h)))−
− Uc
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where the costate variable φ˜D denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the household’s intertem-
poral optimality condition (6) chosen in the previous period by the Ramsey planner and
can be interpreted as the value to the planner of promises that must be honored from past
commitments. To approximate the dynamics under the optimal exchange-rate policy, the
functional equation (36) is solved numerically.18 The parameters used are the same as in
Table 1.
Figure 12 shows that the dynamics during financial crisis episodes under the optimal
exchange-rate policy without capital-control taxes are similar to those under the optimal
exchange-rate policy with optimal capital-control taxes. The main difference is that, in
the case without capital-control taxes, the optimal allocation displays a higher nominal
and real exchange-rate depreciation and, as a result, a smaller unemployment and a
larger current-account adjustment. Therefore, without capital-control taxes, the optimal
policy commits to make credit-access tighter during financial crisis episodes, increasing
the private costs of borrowing.
18The presence of additional states and controls in the case of optimal policy without an optimal capital-
control tax makes the numerical approximation computationally more demanding. For this reason, the









, 51 equally spaced
points for (dt), and 21 equally spaced points for (φ˜
D
t ). For comparison purposes (in this section only)
these grids were also used to solve numerically for the optimal exchange rate with optimal capital-control
taxes
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Without Optimal Capital Control Taxes
Figure 12. Financial Crises – Optimal Policy with No Capital-Control Taxes.
Note: Real exchange rate, real wage, and external debt expressed in log deviations from their sample
means. Current account expressed in deviations of its sample mean. Devaluation rate and unemployment
rate expressed in levels. See Section 4.3 for the definition of a financial crisis episode.
6 Conclusions
This paper conducts a quantitative study of the optimal exchange-rate policy facing a
trade-off between credit access and unemployment, which captures a central discussion
of the policy debate typically observed during financial crises in EMs. In the presence
of downward nominal wage rigidity, allowing for nominal exchange-rate depreciations can
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help attenuate unemployment. In the presence of liability dollarization and collateral
constraints linked to of tradable and nontradable income, fighting real exchange-rate
depreciation alleviates the consumption adjustment.
The main finding is that the optimal exchange-rate policy during financial crises is
consistent with managed-floating exchange-rate regimes, widely used by EMs in periods
of sudden stops: It is optimal to allow for large currency depreciation (between a 17 and
40 percent average fall in the relative price of nontradable goods), but also to contain
currency depreciation with respect to full-employment levels. The bias of the optimal
policy towards large currency depreciation is related to the fact that the welfare costs
from unemployment and lower consumption typically outweigh those of intertemporal
misallocation of consumption.
The findings of the paper suggest that simple policy recipes will, in general, not be opti-
mal during EMs’ financial crises. For instance, both full-employment and fixed–exchange-
rate regimes entail relatively large welfare costs compared to the optimal exchange-rate
policy during financial crisis episodes – 0.06 percent and 1.8 percent of consumption
per period, respectively. Moreover, the paper shows that the optimal degree of “fear
of floating” during financial crises depends on the nature of the shocks, and structural
characteristics of the economy. This means that what is optimal during a financial crisis
episode in a given economy might not be optimal in another economy or in an episode
involving a different combination of shocks.
A novel finding is that sudden stops, understood as large current-account adjustments,
are generally part of the endogenous response to large negative shocks under the optimal
exchange-rate policy. In other words, while exchange-rate policy could prevent sudden
stops by resisting real exchange-rate depreciation, the associated unemployment costs
make this policy suboptimal.
In future research, several extensions related to the present paper’s framework could
be considered. First, the paper abstracts from capital accumulation. Including capital
accumulation would be computationally demanding, but would enrich the study of the
trade-off faced by the policymaker. Second, the paper studies the optimal exchange-rate
policy when the policymaker has access to a commitment technology. An interesting area
of future research is the optimal time-consistent exchange-rate policy in a framework in
which the policymaker does not have commitment. Third, the paper assumes that all
debt is denominated in a foreign currency. A relevant extension would be a study of the
interaction between exchange rate policy and optimal currency composition of external
debt under the framework of this paper. These extensions are planned for future research.
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7 Appendices
7.1 Appendix A: Omitted Constraints in Ramsey Problems
In Section 3.1, to characterize the allocation under the different exchange-rate regimes, I
follow the strategy of setting up the Ramsey problem dropping constraints; this Appendix
shows that the omitted constraints are satisfied.
7.1.1 Optimal Exchange-Rate Policy
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ξ F ′ (ht) to satisfy (16). Given wt−1, pick t to satisfy
(11) with equality: t = γ
wt−1
wt






7.1.2 Full-Employment Exchange-Rate Policy
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t to satisfy (11) with equality: t = γ
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7.1.3 Fixed Exchange-Rate Policy




t , ht, wt, t
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that satisfy (5), (11)–(13), (16)–(18), and



























7.2 Appendix B: Proofs
7.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The Ramsey problem of optimal exchange-rate policy under an optimal capital-control






, subject to (5), (12), (17) and (18).
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t , and φ
W
t are Lagrange multipliers.
The optimality conditions associated with this problem (provided dt+1 < d
N ) are (12),
(17), (18), the first-order conditions
φFt
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and the complementary slackness conditions























First, consider the case with ξ < 1. Assume, contrary to the statement of the propo-









. By (41) it follows that φWt = 0. By (39), and since c
T
t > 0, ht > 0
F ′ (ht) > 0, UcAN
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< 0, this implies that φµt > 0, which









)− dt+t) = 0.
Second, consider the case with ξ ≥ 1. Assume, contrary to the statement of the
proposition, that under the optimal exchange-rate policy, at some date t, ht < h. By
(39), and since cTt > 0, ht > 0 F
′ (ht) > 0, UcAN
(







≥ 0 and φµt ≥ 0,







7.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2
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> 0, by the assumption that
d∗t+1 > d
(
h, cT∗t , yTt
)
, it also follows that d∗t+1 > κyTt , and thus h∗t > 0.
7.2.3 Proof of Remark 1
As shown in Section 7.2.1, the optimality conditions associated with the problem of op-
timal exchange-rate policy with capital-control taxes (Definition 1) are (12), (17), (18),
(37), (38) (39), (40) and (41). In an allocation in which at time t, ht < h, by (41) it
follows that φWt = 0. Replacing in (39), (24) is obtained.
7.3 Appendix C: Data Appendix
1. Sectoral data, Argentina: Constructed using data on value added from agriculture,
manufacturing, and services from the WDI dataset. The tradable sector was defined
as the sum of agriculture and manufacturing sectors. The nontradable sector was
defined as services. Data on relative prices was constructed using current and constant
value added on each sector.
2. External debt, Argentina: Measured using net foreign assets, obtained from Lane and
Milesi-Ferreti (2007) dataset.
3. National accounts, Argentina: Output, consumption, and net exports, obtained from
WEO dataset.
4. Interest rates: For Argentina, since 1994, the country interest rate on external debt was
measured as the sum of country EMBI spreads and the US Treasury-Bill rate, obtained,
respectively, from Datastream and the Federal Reserve of Saint Louis datasets. The
series were extended back to 1983 using Neumeyer and Perri (2005) dataset, which
uses a measure similar to the one considered here. The risk-free rate was measured
with the Treasury-Bill rate. The interest rate series is then deflated with a measure of






where it denotes the interest rate on Argentinean external debt in US dollars, and





is obtained as the one-step-ahead forecast of an
estimated AR(1). US CPI data was obtained from the Federal Reserve of Saint Louis
dataset. For EMs, spreads (Figure 4) were measured with the EMBI, obtained from
Datastream.
5. Unemployment rate, Argentina: Obtained from INDEC. Since 2003, excludes govern-
ment social plan “Jefas y Jefes ” .
6. Nominal wage, Argentina: Obtained from Calvo, Coricelli, and Ottonello (2012) dataset.
7. Balance of payments, Argentina: Current account and factor services obtained from
IFS dataset.
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8. Measured TFP, Argentina: Obtained from Aravena and Fuentes (2013) dataset.
9. Nominal exchange rates and international reserves, EMs: Obtained from IFS dataset.
7.4 Appendix D: Recursive Formulation of the Optimal Exchange-Rate
Policy without Capital-Control Taxes
This section shows how to obtain a recursive formulation of the problem of optimal
exchange-rate policy without capital-control taxes, using the recursive saddle-point method
developed in Marcet and Marimon (2011). Without capital-control taxes, the general
equilibrium dynamics are given by stochastic processes {cNt , cTt , ht, pt, wt, dt+1, λt, µt}∞t=0
satisfying the set of equations (GE′): {(5)–(9), (11)–(13), (15)–(18)} given an exchange-
rate policy {t}∞t=0, initial conditions w−1 and d0, and exogenous stochastic processes
{yTt , Rt}∞t=0.
To characterize the allocation under the optimal exchange-rate policy, without optimal
capital-control taxes, and under commitment, I begin by setting up the Ramsey problem
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To obtain the recursive formulation using the method of Marcet and Marimon (2011),
the following steps are followed (as in Adam and Billi, 2005). First, set the Lagrangean of
problem (42), denoting φDt the Lagrange multiplier associated with the forward looking
constraint (6). Since equation (6) is forward-looking, some terms in the Lagrangean
involve period t Lagrange multipliers multiplied by period t+ 1 controls (e.g., φDt Etλt+1).
Second, in these terms, relabel the Lagrange multipliers multiplied by period t+1 controls
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Fourth, using the equivalence results shown in Marcet and Marimon (2011), re-express
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Finally, rewrite the infinite-horizon saddle-point problem (44) in recursive form:
WOP
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where time subscripts for variables dated in period t have been dropped, and a prime is
used to indicate variables dated in period t+ 1.
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